Daily Kos

Drug War Roundup - The State Department, The Senlis Council, and the War in Afghanistan

Fri Mar 02, 2007 at 06:56:16 PM PDT

Five years after coalition forces went into Afghanistan to topple the Taliban, the country is still struggling with security problems while the Taliban has been able to rebuild itself and continue to challenge the Karzai government. Just about everyone from the Bush Administration to the UN to NATO leadership recognizes that the opium trade is the root cause of our problems there. Afghanistan produces 90% of the world's illicit supply of opium, raking in billions of dollars for those who are able to grow it, process it, and export it to the west. In a poor country like Afghanistan, this money has easily corrupted officials all the way up through the government.

In addition to the opium trade, Taliban militias have gained strength since they were deposed, and are also being helped by a resurgence of Al Qaeda activity across the border in Pakistan. The combination of these factors seriously threatens to return the country right back to the Taliban era that existed in the years before 9/11.

While almost everyone agrees that the opium trade is the main problem, there are big differences over how to deal with it. The Bush Administration has used its authority to push for strong eradication programs, including aerial spraying. The British and the Karzai government oppose that approach, but support ground-based eradication. The Canadians have been even more reluctant to follow America's lead, but have done so anyway.

Another option for dealing with the problem is one put forth by the Senlis Council, a think tank based in Paris. Their solution is to license the opium farming so that Afghan farmers can grow poppies legally and contribute to the world's supply of opiate-based medicines. The European Union endorsed this approach, but other than odd utterances from Donald Rumsfeld, there's no indication that this approach is being seriously being considered by American or NATO leadership right now.

But as the current approach continues to fail, the calls for a different one are growing, many of whom endorse the Senlis Council's strategy. As a result, the U.S. State Department released a report last week in response to the Senlis Council's proposal, dismissing it as an unfeasible approach. While the Senlis Council's ideas are not expected to be a silver bullet solution, and can't be counted on to address some of the larger problems with the global opium trade, the State Department's defense of the disastrous status quo is a good study in why we continue to fail at our mission to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan.

The report reaches five main conclusions for opposing the Senlis Council's approach, which they simply refer to as "legalization". They introduce their conclusions with this statement:

On both a practical and factual basis, we disagree with the conclusions of those who advocate legalization and any policy prescriptions put forward to achieve this goal.

Right away, there's a misunderstanding over the motivations and the goals of the Senlis Council. Legalization is not the goal. Peace and stability is the goal. Licensing the production of opium is the strategy being advocated to reach that goal. The Senlis Council does not believe that all heroin use should be legal. When they advocate for "legalization", they are advocating for legal avenues for Afghan farmers to grow the crop for the world supply of legal opiate-based medicines. It's very important to understand this difference. Whether or not the State Department blurs the line intentionally or not, I don't know.

The five separate conclusions they reach vary greatly in their validity. I'll discuss them each one by one.

The licit opium market is not lucrative enough to entice Afghan farmers - The price difference between licit and illicit opium is so substantial that Afghan farmers would not quit the black market. To make up for the price difference, exorbitant subsidies would have to be offered, which would prove prohibitively expensive. Moreover, the Government of Afghanistan would be obligated to purchase opium stocks, resulting in the crops exponential expansion as more farmers would grow to take advantage of a guaranteed source of income.

There is certainly some truth to this. The prices earned by licit opium producers in some of the countries that allow it are much lower than what can be obtained from the black market. Whether or not Afghan farmers decide to stay within the law will depend on whether they think they'll get caught. Opium farmers who get caught in the current system often find themselves unable to provide for their families once their crops are destroyed. If the Afghan government can provide a guaranteed living wage for their crop, some farmers will certainly choose that path, even if they could make much more by breaking the law.

But there are still two problems with this. The first problem is that as the supply of the illicit drugs making their way to the west starts to go down, the prices will go up, and the rewards for those who break the law will increase. The second problem is that, for many of Afghanistan's farmers, the decision about what to grow isn't made by them. It's made by the warlords. And the warlords are much less discouraged by eradications than the farmers are. Even in a licensing system, farmers could still get screwed if they are forced to contribute to the illicit market and get caught, but the hope is that they'll place the blame on the warlords rather than on the central government. Under the status quo, any time an opium farm is destroyed, the Karzai government is seen as the enemy. Even under an imperfect system, licensing even a small percentage of the overall production will keep more farmers from seeking out the Taliban and other militias for protection.

There is no legitimate world demand for legally produced opium from Afghanistan - According to the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)[6] - whose mandate includes maintaining the balance between supply and demand for licitly produced narcotics like opium - world demand for opium-based medicines is fully met. World stockpiles are also sufficient to meet any conceivable future or increased demand.

This conclusion may be fairly accurate. I haven't been able to find a lot of evidence either way. The Senlis Council believes that there are major shortages of opiate-based medicines in the developing world. I don't doubt that that's true, but I have no way of knowing whether that's from a lack of supply, or from other logistical problems and bureaucratic hurdles that prevent the supplies from getting to where they're needed. It's also important to note that the farmers in the countries that contribute to the legal supplies don't want to have to compete with Afghan farmers, for the same reason American workers don't like competing with foreign workers who will work for less.

It is not feasible - Countries which produce licit opium have strict controls, sophisticated law enforcement, and licensing systems - and still admit to significant illegal diversion. The lack of law enforcement and security in Afghanistan has led to the explosion of the current illicit poppy crop, so a licit industry which relies on legal controls could not work. Without safeguards, licit and illicit opium would be indistinguishable. Opium really destined for the black market would be produced under the pretense of a legal system.

There are several problems with this analysis. If the countries which produce licit opium had significant illegal diversion problems, Afghanistan would not be producing 90% of the world's heroin supplies. Australia, one of the sanctioned producing nations, certainly wouldn't have so many of its citizens getting caught in Southeast Asia smuggling heroin back home if that were true. The drug trade finds the path of least resistance when it comes to the supply chain, and the lawlessness of Afghanistan has been the end of that path for a number of years.

The strategy of licensing the production is also not being done to eliminate illicit drug supplies worldwide. That would be impossible to do just by focusing on Afghanistan alone. As long as there is demand for the drugs throughout the world, the supplies will come from somewhere. The strategy is to allow more Afghan farmers to do legally what they've been doing for years without driving them to seek alliances and protection from those who oppose the Karzai government. If this causes some other part of the world to become the path of least resistance for the drug traffickers, then the illicit opium farming will shift there. For example, one possible outcome of allowing Afghan farmers to grow licit supplies of opium would be that production in South America would again increase and the traffickers who already bring large amounts of cocaine from South America to Europe would be able to start exporting more heroin there as well (much of the heroin that comes to North America today comes from South America, not Afghanistan). I'm sure there'd be diversion from Afghanistan's licit supplies as well, especially since they are still far from having adequate law enforcement throughout the country, but that problem would still be a much lesser one than what we're currently stuck dealing with.

Historical experience argues against this approach - Lessons from India, Pakistan, Bolivia, and other countries show the often disastrous effects of legalizing drug production without the requisite market demand or law enforcement and control mechanisms. Each of these countries attempted to regulate a legal trade in narcotics and, as a result, saw an increase in cultivation or significant diversion into the black market.

This is some very selective history. The example of Turkey in the 1970s [PDF] is a great example of how the Senlis Council's approach has worked in the past, and could work again. Even then, some were worried about diversion, but after the U.S. agreed to purchase legal supplies of opium from Turkish farmers, illicit production stopped and never returned. This didn't mean that heroin disappeared from the streets of London and New York, though. The production just moved to another part of the world - Afghanistan. The lesson is that while it's impossible to completely eliminate the demand for these drugs, you can focus on an area and remove it from being the path of least resistance. Trying to eliminate the drug trade like this all around the world would be a waste of money and resources, but with such fervent anti-American groups in the area reaping the benefits, it's a good idea to do it there, and soon. But it's still only a partial solution to the bigger problem of heroin trafficking.

Legalization is ultimately counterproductive and dangerous - Legalization would expand and entrench the drug trade, undermining ongoing efforts to bring security and sustainable economic development. This would benefit insurgent groups such as the Taliban who have been known to profit from the trade, as well as criminals and corrupt government officials. Afghanistan would suffer from more violence, lawlessness, and corruption as a result of legalization, not less. Expanding opium cultivation would also come at the expense of important efforts to diversify Afghanistan's economy, making the country's welfare dangerously reliant on one commodity.

This final conclusion is a mix of poor assumptions and bad logic which makes it very clear why we're headed for disaster in Afghanistan. Legalization, in the limited sense that the Senlis Council is advocating, would not expand or entrench the drug trade in any way. The drug trade exists to feed the demand of western (and increasingly, Chinese, Indian, Iranian and Russian) consumers. There's no reason to believe that giving Afghan farmers the option to grow opium for legal markets would encourage more Afghan farmers who hadn't been growing it illegally to start doing so, any more than farmers in other parts of the world would be. The economic and other societal factors that encourage opium farming have existed for years there. The Senlis Council's proposal doesn't address this larger issue because it's one that can't be solved within Afghanistan. It's a battle that can only be won where demand for the drug exists.

As for the Taliban, this conclusion completely misreads the role they play in the drug trade as well. The Taliban are not farmers and they're not drug traffickers. The Taliban only profits from the drug trade because they provide protection against the Afghan government's eradication teams. If the government wasn't forced to go after the illegal opium farming, that would immediately cut off revenue from the Taliban. The idea that a broad legalization would help the Taliban is completely backwards. They profit from our efforts to eradicate the harvests, not just from the fact that there's opium farming alone, and this dynamic that we've created is now the biggest factor leading towards the collapse of the country's new government.

If we want to look towards real solutions on how to keep Afghanistan from reverting back to its pre-9/11 instability and lawlessness, the Senlis Council's approach to the opium farming is only one small step, but it's a good one. To make more serious inroads into fighting illegal drug trafficking, nations where the demand for drugs like heroin and methadone drive the market need to be considering treating addiction as a medical, rather than a criminal problem.

The UK Home Office this week revealed that they are now headed in that direction, looking towards providing addicts with supplies of the drug in a medical capacity. This approach is finally starting to gain momentum across the globe now that the Swiss demonstrated its effectiveness over a ten year period where they reduced crime, overdoses, and most impressively, the number of new recreational users. Countries like Canada and Australia are already on board with their own programs in Vancouver and Sydney, but the United States still does not have a single one.

Last year's Taliban spring offensive in Afghanistan intensified as the opium plants were harvested and sent off to heroin processing labs in April and May.  This freed up the Taliban to fight coalition forces and left them with money to spend. This year, the same pattern is occurring again, but with another years' worth of angry farmers and a stronger Al-Qaeda presence to the south, it will be an even more difficult battle for our coalition forces to defend Karzai's government. The solutions for fixing these problems exist, but still remain non-starters within even the more moderate elements of the Bush Administration.

Afghanistan has long been thought of as a place where empires have crumbled. I have no idea what it really is about that land, but we're seeing it again right now, as the American approach to the war on drugs there is clearly causing us to fail at our much more important war against Islamic terrorism.  The authoritarian principles of the American drug war dictate that anything that even resembles "legalization" must be feared and fought, even if it's very clearly a path to a better outcome.  And whether we're dealing with Helmand Province or Southern California, there are better ways.

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